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THE SELECTIVE “WAR ON TERROR”: 
EXECUTIVE DETENTION OF FOREIGN 
NATIONALS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF  
NON-DISCRIMINATION 
Daniel Moeckli∗ 
We have never had a trial. We were found guilty without one. We are 
imprisoned indefinitely and probably forever. We have no idea why. We 
have not been told what the evidence is against us. We are here. Speak 
to us. Listen to us.1 
[T]he message [of a culture of formalism] is that there must be limits to 
the exercise of power, that those who are in positions of strength must 
be accountable and that those who are weak must be heard and pro-
tected . . .2 
The detention of suspected terrorists at the instance of the executive, 
without charge or trial, is one of the most draconian measures a state can 
adopt to combat terrorism. Winston Churchill famously described the 
power of the executive to imprison an individual as “in the highest de-
gree odious.”3 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens called it “the hall-
mark of the totalitarian state.”4 Nevertheless, the two leading forces of 
the “war on terror,” the United States and the United Kingdom, found it 
necessary to resort to this particularly extreme form of deprivation of 
liberty after September 11, 2001. What is perhaps even more remarkable 
is that both these states made their respective detention powers applica-
ble to foreign, but not to domestic, terrorist suspects. 
The recent landmark decision of the British House of Lords in A v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department highlighted the fundamental 
problems that the reliance of contemporary anti-terrorism measures on 
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 1. Letter from nine men detained in Belmarsh prison under the British anti-terrorism 
powers described in this Article, signed “The forgotten detainees.”  Listen to Us, 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 26, 2004, available at http://www. guardian.co.uk/letters/story/0,, 
1156318,00.html. 
 2. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 502 (2001). 
 3. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT 
TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN 391 (1992) [hereinafter SIMPSON, HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS]. 
 4. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 723 (1990) (Stevens J., dissent-
ing). 
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distinctions according to citizenship raises with regard to the interna-
tional human rights principle of non-discrimination.5 The Law Lords 
held that the preventive detention powers of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act (ATCSA),6 passed by British parliament in November 
2001, violated the non-discrimination guarantee of Article 14 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms,7 because no reasonable and objective justification ex-
isted for limiting the scope of their application to foreign terrorist sus-
pects.8 As a reaction to the judgment, the British government repealed 
the detention scheme and replaced it with lesser forms of restriction that 
are applicable irrespective of nationality.9 In contrast, the parallel U.S. 
system providing for asymmetric detention powers remains in force. 
The purpose of this Article is to assess whether unequal treatment of 
non-citizens with regard to anti-terrorism detention may ever be com-
patible with the international human rights principle of non-
discrimination. An analysis of executive detention powers from a non-
discrimination perspective may not only reveal possible inconsistencies 
of domestic anti-terrorism regimes with the framework of international 
law, but, as the reactions of the British government and public to the 
House of Lords decision demonstrate,10 it can also have a profound po-
litical impact: insisting on non-discriminatory powers can pave the way 
for a more principled debate about the acceptability of restrictions of lib-
erty in the fight against terrorism. Requiring political actors to articulate 
their claims in terms of universally applicable rules is an important in-
strument of restraining state power and helps protect those who are most 
likely to be subjected to its worst excesses. Justice Jackson stressed this 
crucial function of the equality guarantee more than fifty years ago: 
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and un-
reasonable government than to require that the principles of law which 
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. 
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as 
to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they 
will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that 
might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can 
                                                                                                             
 5. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 
paras. 58–63 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 6. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23 (U.K.). 
 7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
14, Nov. 4, 1950, 1955 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 8. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, paras. 67–68. 
 9. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1, 2 (U.K.). 
 10. For these reactions, see infra text accompanying notes 196–98. 
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take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require 
that laws be equal in operation.11 
Part I of this Article will illustrate that it is far from a new phenomenon 
that executive detention powers are mainly directed against non-citizens. 
Even though efforts to curb the power of the executive branch to deprive 
people of their liberty were made as early as in medieval times, certain 
grounds have always been seen as sufficient to justify this far-reaching 
measure. Historically, the most important justification relied upon by 
governments was national security: foreign citizens thought to pose a risk 
to the security of the nation have regularly been preventively detained in 
times of crisis. More recently, states have often invoked their power to 
regulate immigration to justify the detention of foreigners. 
Just like executive detention powers in general, so has the more spe-
cific power to preventively detain suspected terrorists normally been tar-
geted at groups viewed as alien. The U.S. Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 made this focus explicit by linking counter-
terrorism to immigration control.12 The detention powers adopted after 
September 11 in both the United Kingdom and the United States con-
tinue this tradition of making the detention of terrorist suspects ancillary 
to the enforcement of immigration law. Part II will set out the relevant 
legal schemes of these states. 
Whether detention powers conform to legal guarantees of the principle 
of non-discrimination cannot be answered without consideration of the 
objectives they are designed to achieve. The central elements of any dis-
crimination analysis, comparability and proportionality, must be judged 
in relation to the actual aim pursued by the measure in question. Part III 
will therefore analyze the policy rationales behind the British and U.S. 
powers of preventive detention. Although they have been placed in an 
immigration context, these powers, it is argued, in fact serve to counter 
terrorism rather than to enforce the immigration laws. 
Part IV will demonstrate that the United Kingdom and the United 
States are bound by international law to respect the principle of non-
discrimination and that this obligation is reinforced by corresponding 
domestic norms of both states, requiring equal treatment. Importantly, 
this common standard of equality includes a prohibition of differential 
treatment on the basis of citizenship. 
                                                                                                             
 11. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). 
 12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1268–81 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). For a 
more detailed description, see infra Part II.A. 
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Part V will assess the compatibility of asymmetric detention powers 
with this requirement of non-discrimination. Three sub-tests are particu-
larly critical to this assessment: What is the applicable standard of re-
view? Are foreign terrorist suspects in a comparable situation to sus-
pected terrorists who are nationals? Is there an objective and reasonable 
justification for the difference in treatment? Answering these questions in 
relation to the detention powers in issue enables the elaboration of a set 
of standards that can be applied to the preventive detention of terrorist 
suspects in general. 
I. EXECUTIVE DETENTION 
The expression “executive detention” or “administrative detention” is 
commonly used to mean detention at the behest of the executive branch 
of government without charge and without trial, often for an indefinite 
period. Since the purpose of such detention is typically the prevention of 
future harm rather than punishment, the term “preventive detention” is 
equally apposite. This is also true for the detention of terrorist suspects, 
and, accordingly, the adjectives “executive,” “administrative” and “pre-
ventive” can be used interchangeably in the present context. The term 
“internment” more specifically describes confinement ordered by the 
executive during wartime. 
Already these summary descriptions reveal the two critical elements 
that distinguish executive detention from imprisonment for criminal of-
fences. First, the detainees are not held because they have done anything 
wrong, but because they might do something wrong in the future. Sec-
ond, the decision that someone poses a threat is the result of an adminis-
trative process, rather than of a public trial before a court. Both the fact 
that the assessment as to dangerous propensity is inherently discretionary 
and that there is a lack of judicial involvement in the decision-making 
process make executive detention a particularly serious deprivation of 
liberty, placing individuals under the complete control of the state. As a 
consequence, such detainees are in an especially vulnerable position that 
may be further exacerbated by the secrecy that often surrounds this form 
of detention. 
It is therefore not surprising that efforts to establish basic safeguards 
against arbitrary detention date back a long time. With the Magna Carta 
121513 and the Petition of Right 162814 as its pillars, the common-law 
                                                                                                             
 13. Magna Carta provides: “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or 
outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by 
the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.” Magna Carta 1215, 17 John, 
c. 39, reprinted in JAMES CLARKE HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d ed.1992). 
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tradition produced, very early on, a system of procedural devices and 
norms designed to prevent the abuse of detention powers. In this sense, 
freedom from arbitrary detention could be called the oldest of human 
rights.15 Today, the fundamental importance of the right to personal free-
dom is reflected in its widespread codification in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,16 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),17 such international “soft law”18 standards as the U.N. 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment19 and the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners,20 regional human rights treaties including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms,21 the American Convention on Human Rights22 and 
                                                                                                             
 14. Petition of Right 1628, 4 Car., c. V, available at http:// www.constitution.org/eng/ 
petright.htm (declaring the remedy of habeas corpus). 
 15. See also Tom Bingham, Personal Freedom and the Dilemma of Democracies, 52 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 841, 842 (2003). 
 16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 3, 9, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 9, 10, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 18. The term “soft law” is commonly used to describe non-binding international in-
struments, often adopted by way of UN General Assembly resolutions. They exercise a 
considerable influence on the international decision-making process as states frequently 
rely on them and are reluctant openly to contravene them. Thus, they engender legal ex-
pectations and may entail a presumption of illegality when action is taken contrary to 
them. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, Hersch Lauterpacht―The Scholar as Judge (pt. 2), 38 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8–12 (1962); Christoph Schreuer, Recommendations and the Tradi-
tional Sources of International Law, 20 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 103, 115–18 (1977); Con-
temporary Views on the Sources of International Law: The Effect of U.N. Resolutions on 
Emerging Legal Norms, 73 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 300, 327–28 (1979) (comment 
made by Myres S. McDougal during discussion of Oscar M. Garibaldi’s discussion of 
The Legal Status of General Assembly Resolutions); Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-
Legal Norms—A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?, 11 NETH. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 65, 85–86 (1980); Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understand-
ing “Soft Law,” 30 MCGILL L.J. 37, 46 (1984). 
 19. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, annex, at 298, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9, 1988). 
 20. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted Aug. 30, 1955, 
by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. Res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. 
(No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR 
Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977) [hereinafter Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners]. 
 21. European Convention, supra note 7, art. 5. 
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the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,23 as well as numer-
ous national constitutions.24 
It should be noted, however, that all these standards do not guarantee a 
right to be free from executive detention but rather impose limits on the 
use of this far-reaching power by restricting the permissible grounds for 
detention25 or providing for certain procedural safeguards.26 Executive 
detention is thus not generally prohibited. In fact, it is, in one form or 
another, a common feature of most legal systems. Executive detention 
powers are employed, for example, against criminal suspects, vagrants, 
the mentally ill, drug addicts, those believed to pose a risk to national 
security, and immigrants.27 It is the last two categories of persons who 
have been the subjects of the most pervasive instances of executive de-
tention. 
States have generally been seen as allowed to restrict the right to lib-
erty in times of crisis, and the internment of those thought to pose a na-
tional security risk has a long history. In the United Kingdom, the first of 
a series of Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts, allowing the executive to 
hold individuals on treason charges without bringing them to trial, was 
introduced as early as 1688.28 During the second part of the nineteenth 
century, Ireland was governed with the use of detention powers which 
were shielded from any form of judicial supervision.29 The British gov-
ernment again relied upon preventive detention powers in both world 
wars to intern 30,000 and 28,000 “enemy aliens” respectively.30 Finally, 
as Brian Simpson has pointed out, the power of executive detention was 
“always valued in the colonies”31 and, even in the waning years of the 
                                                                                                             
 22. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 
22, 1969, art. 7, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]. 
 23. Organization of African Unity: Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
art. 6, Jan. 7–19, 1981, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58, 60. (1982). 
 24. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 25. See European Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1). 
 26. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 9. 
 27. See European Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1) (expressly authorizing the deten-
tion of all these categories of persons except those thought to pose a risk to national secu-
rity). See id. art. 15(1) (stating with regard to this latter group, however, that states can 
provide for executive detention by derogating from the right to liberty on the ground that 
there is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation). 
 28. ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 94 (2d ed.1989). 
 29. SIMPSON, HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS, supra note 3, at 3–4; A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE 79–80 (2001) [hereinafter SIMPSON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS]. 
 30. SIMPSON, HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS, supra note 3, at 15, 163. 
 31. SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 876. 
2006] THE SELECTIVE "WAR ON TERROR" 501 
British Empire, used to incarcerate tens of thousands of troublesome po-
litical opponents.32 In the United States, the Enemy Alien Act, adopted in 
1798 and still on the books today, authorizes the President during a de-
clared war to detain or expel any citizen of a country with which the 
United States is at war.33 This power was invoked against the British in 
the War of 1812 and to detain about 2,300 Germans and Austro-
Hungarians during World War I.34 In the Second World War, executive 
orders issued by President Roosevelt were relied upon in addition to the 
Enemy Alien Act to intern 110,000 persons of Japanese descent in iso-
lated desert camps.35 Internment initiatives such as these have later been 
heavily criticized and are now widely regarded as excessive. Today, con-
temporary international human rights instruments guaranteeing the right 
to liberty put important restrictions on the ability of states to adopt ex-
ecutive detention powers for national security reasons,36 even though the 
right to liberty can be derogated from when there is a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation.37 
The fact that detention based on national security has become less ac-
cepted by the international community may be one of the reasons why 
the existence of another type of crisis has frequently been asserted in 
more recent years to justify executive detention powers: the perceived 
immigration crisis. The right of the state to control immigration and to 
detain non-nationals pending either their admission or expulsion is gen-
erally recognized in international law,38 and immigration detention is a 
common practice among states today. As the influx of immigrants into 
western countries has come to be seen as a serious danger requiring re-
strictive and deterrent action, many states have enacted legislation to en-
                                                                                                             
 32. In 1954, for instance, 30,000 people were arrested in Kenya in an operation de-
signed to identify Mau Mau supporters. Id. at 879–80. 
 33. Enemy Alien Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2002). 
 34. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 92 (2003). 
 35. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 36. See European Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1) (does not list national security as 
one of the permissible grounds for detention). 
 37. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 4; European Convention, supra note 7, art. 15; 
American Convention, supra note 22, art. 27. For good overviews of the subject, see 
JAIME ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992); 
ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
STATES OF EXCEPTION (1998). 
 38. For an overview, see Daniel Wilsher, The Administrative Detention of Non-
Nationals Pursuant to Immigration Control: International and Constitutional Law Per-
spectives, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 897 (2004). Article 5(1)(f) of the European Convention 
explicitly authorizes immigration detention. European Convention, supra note 7, art. 
5(1)(f). 
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hance their powers to detain foreign citizens and to authorize longer pe-
riods of detention.39 As a consequence, in the United States, for example, 
the immigration authorities detained more than 230,000 non-citizens in 
the fiscal year 2003;40 the corresponding figure for the United Kingdom 
has been put at approximately 35,000.41 Despite stable or falling rates of 
asylum-seekers entering western countries, and even though relevant 
guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees pro-
vide that as a general rule asylum-seekers should not be detained,42 re-
cent years have also seen an increase in the number of this category of 
foreign nationals being detained.43 
As this short account demonstrates, foreign citizens have always been 
the main target of executive detention powers. While states have often 
invoked threats to national security to justify the preventive detention of 
non-nationals, in recent years they have also relied upon the far-reaching 
powers linked to the right to control immigration. In fact, these two 
grounds for detention, national security and immigration control, which 
were originally seen as separate though closely related areas, are now 
becoming increasingly intertwined. For reasons to be explained in Part 
III of this Article, some states have adopted detention powers pursuing 
national security aims within an immigration context. The executive de-
tention of suspected foreign terrorists is the prime example of this ap-
proach. 
                                                                                                             
 39. For Europe, see Jane Hughes & Ophelia Field, Recent Trends in the Detention of 
Asylum Seekers in Western Europe, in DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EUROPE: 
ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVES 5 (Jane Hughes & Fabrice Liebaut eds., 1998); for the 
United States, see Paolo Morante, Detention of Asylum Seekers: The United States Per-
spective, in DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EUROPE, supra, at 85. 
 40. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: ICE Office of Detention 
and Removal Operations, May. 4, 2004, http://www.ice.gov/text/news/factsheets/dro050 
404.htm. 
 41. Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Seeking Asylum is Not a Crime: Deten-
tion of People Who Have Sought Asylum, at 43, AI Doc. EUR 45/015/2005 (June 20, 
2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ EUR450152005ENGLISH/$File/ 
EUR4501505.pdf. 
 42. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applica-
ble Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, Guideline No.2 
(Feb. 1999). See also U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, No. 
44 Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers (1986), http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/excom/opendoc.htm?tbl=EXCOM&page=home&id=3ae68c43c0. 
 43. See Hughes & Field, supra note 39, at 7–17; U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, Reception Standards for Asylum Seekers in the European Union, at 31–32 (July 
2000); Amnesty International, supra note 41, at 43. 
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II. EXECUTIVE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 
One national security matter that has regularly led states to resort to 
powers of executive detention is terrorism. Governments often claim that 
they cannot bring suspected terrorists to trial because of the sensitivity of 
the evidence involved in these sorts of cases or the high standard of proof 
required.44 The authority to disable, or at least isolate suspects despite a 
lack of evidence admissible in court is an alternative to trial that many 
states have not been willing to forego. Both the United Kingdom and the 
United States had deployed this instrument already before September 11 
to target particular groups of alleged terrorists. Since the attacks of that 
date, states all over the world have reinforced their respective powers. 
A. Before September 11 
In the United Kingdom, the power of detention without trial had al-
ready been in force for decades prior to September 11. However, it was 
never applied universally, but remained limited to Northern Ireland, 
where it was primarily deployed against the Republican minority.45 It 
was a regular feature of a series of anti-terrorism laws both during the 
fifty years under the Northern Ireland government46 and under “direct 
rule,”47 even though it was not used after 197548 and finally repealed in 
1998.49 
The United States has also limited the scope of application of its ex-
ecutive detention powers, but has done so by placing them within an 
                                                                                                             
 44. For example, in support of its detention powers under the ATCSA and the house 
arrest powers under the new Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the British government 
argued that the use of intercept evidence or other sensitive information in court could 
alert suspected terrorists or compromise sources. See, e.g., Statement of the Home Secre-
tary (Mr. Charles Clarke) in the House of Commons of Feb. 22, 2005, 431 PARL. DEB., 
H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 152. 
 45. See generally R.J. Spjut, Internment and Detention Without Trial in Northern 
Ireland 1971–1975: Ministerial Policy and Practice, 49 MOD. L. REV. 712 (1986) [here-
inafter Spjut, Internment and Detention]. 
 46. The legal basis for internment was created by the Civil Authorities (Special Pow-
ers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922. The powers were used 1922–1924, 1938–1945 and 
1956–1961. Id. at 713. For a historical account, see JOHN MCGUFFIN, INTERNMENT 
(1973). 
 47. See Emergency Provisions (Northern Ireland) Acts, 1973–1998. For an assess-
ment, see R.J. Spjut, Executive Detention in Northern Ireland: The Gardiner Report and 
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act 1975, 10 IRISH JURIST 
272 (1975); Spjut, Internment and Detention, supra note 45. 
 48. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION 
AGAINST TERRORISM, 1996, Cm. 3420, at 99. 
 49. Emergency Provisions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1998, c. 9, § 3. 
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immigration context. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 was passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 
and is still in force today.50 Although a U.S. citizen had perpetrated the 
attack, the most draconian measures of the Act are only applicable to 
foreign terrorist suspects. In this sense, it can be seen as a precursor to 
the post-September 11 anti-terrorism laws. The Act authorizes the Attor-
ney General to initiate special “Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures” 
against non-citizens allegedly involved in terrorism and to detain them 
until removal.51 If no country is willing to receive them, they may be 
held indefinitely.52 
B. After September 11 
The attacks of September 11 led not only the United Kingdom and the 
United States, but also numerous other countries to introduce new (or 
strengthen existing) executive detention powers. This can be seen as 
characteristic of a wider trend towards the reliance on preventive policies 
to counter terrorism. Since the current terrorist threat is generally per-
ceived as an unprecedented, diffuse ideological challenge that is increas-
ingly difficult to attribute to individual perpetrators, laws and strategies 
adopted in the wake of September 11 are primarily designed to anticipate 
this indeterminate danger, including by disabling potential terrorists, 
rather than to bring terrorist perpetrators to justice.53 Countries that have, 
                                                                                                             
 50. Jennifer A. Beall, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 693 (1998). 
 51. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1259–60 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37). The removal procedures, 
which take place before a special court, sharply curtail procedural rights: the non-citizen 
may be prevented from examining classified evidence; unlawfully obtained evidence is 
admissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(d)(5), (e)(1)(A). 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2)(C). 
 53. Evidence for this trend towards ever more prophylactic measures can be found in 
the major new anti-terrorism laws of both the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Apart from authorizing preventive detention, the British ATCSA introduced measures 
intended to prevent the financing of terrorism (Parts I and II), facilitate the sharing of 
information between different public authorities and the retention of communications 
data (Parts III and XI), and improve the security of dangerous substances that may be 
used or targeted by terrorists (Part VII). Furthermore, it tightened the asylum proceedings 
(Part IV). Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 1–32, 58–75, 102–07 
(U.K.). The core parts of the USA Patriot Act expanded surveillance and intelligence 
sharing powers (Title II), introduced new measures to prevent the financing of terrorism 
(Title III), and tightened the immigration laws (Title IV). Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, §§ 201–25, 301–03, 311–30, 351–66, 
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accordingly, adopted new laws authorizing the administrative detention 
of terrorist suspects include Australia,54 Canada,55 India,56 Indonesia,57 
and Pakistan.58 
In these states, anyone can be detained at the instance of the executive, 
albeit only for limited periods of time. In contrast, the United States and, 
at least originally, the United Kingdom chose, in line with their previous 
legislative measures, to provide for stringent indefinite detention powers, 
but to restrict the scope of their application: they were made ancillary to 
immigration control and thus limited to foreign terrorist suspects. After 
the House of Lords had ruled that the detention of only foreign nationals 
was discriminatory, the British government eventually replaced the ex-
ecutive detention powers with lesser forms of restriction of liberty that 
                                                                                                             
371–77, 401–05, 411–18, 421–28, 115 Stat. 272, 278–363. Various other provisions simi-
larly focus on prevention. See, e.g., id. §§ 501–02. 
 54. In 2003, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 was amended 
to authorize the detention for questioning by the Australian Security Intelligence Organi-
sation of persons who are believed to be able to provide information that will “substan-
tially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism of-
fence.” Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act, 1979, § 34C(3)(a). Detention 
under such a “warrant for questioning” can last for a period of seven days. Id. § 34HC. 
Further warrants may be issued, which can in turn be used as the basis for further periods 
of seven day detention. Id. § 34D(1)(a). 
 55. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a 
terrorist activity will be carried out and reasonable grounds to believe that this is neces-
sary to prevent the carrying out of a terrorist activity, a peace officer may ask a judge to 
order a person to enter into recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behavior. If 
the person refuses to enter into the recognizance, he or she can be detained for up to one 
year. Anti-Terrorism Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41, § 83.3 (Can). 
 56. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, passed by Parliament in 2002, authorizes the 
detention of terrorist suspects without charge or trial for 90 days. The Prevention of Ter-
rorism Act, No. 15 of 2002; India Code (2002), § 49(2). A Special Court can extend this 
period to 180 days on application by the Public Prosecutor. Id. § 49(2)(b). 
 57. Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1, enacted in 2002, permits the police 
to detain terrorist suspects for seven days without charge, based on any intelligence re-
ports as “preliminary evidence,” and for a further six months for investigation and prose-
cution. Government Regulation in Lieu of Legislation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 
1/2002 on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism, 2002, §§ 25(2), 26(1), 28 (Indon.), 
available at http://www.law. unimelb.edu.au/alc/indonesia/perpu_1.html. 
 58. The Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, promulgated in 2002, provides that 
any person suspected of affiliation with a terrorist organization or with any group or or-
ganization suspected to be involved in terrorism or sectarianism can be arrested and de-
tained without charge for a period which may be extended for up to one year. Anti-
Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002, § 11EE (Pak.), available at http://www.satp. 
org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/actsandordinences/anti_terrorism_ordin_2002
.htm. 
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are applicable to both citizens and foreign nationals. In the United States, 
however, the detention powers are still in force. 
1. United Kingdom 
Following the U.S. detention model, rather than the internment scheme 
previously deployed in Northern Ireland, the British government placed 
their post-September 11 detention powers within an immigration con-
text.59 The legal basis for the detention of foreign terrorist suspects with-
out charge and trial was created by the ATCSA, which came into force 
on December 14, 2001. Part 4 of the ATCSA authorized the Home Sec-
retary to certify a person as a “suspected international terrorist” if he 
“reasonably (a) believes that the person’s presence in the United King-
dom is a risk to national security, and (b) suspects that the person is a 
terrorist.”60 The only means of challenging the Home Secretary’s certifi-
cation was by way of appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Com-
mission (SIAC).61 Upon certification as a “suspected international terror-
ist,” a non-British citizen could be detained without charge or trial for an 
unspecified period of time if his or her removal or deportation was pre-
vented as a result of the United Kingdom’s international obligations or 
for practical reasons.62 Because Article 5(1)(f) of the European Conven-
tion only allows member states to detain non-nationals as long as depor-
tation proceedings are in progress and there is a realistic prospect of re-
moval,63 the United Kingdom had to derogate from this part of the Euro-
pean Convention.64 
                                                                                                             
 59. See Ben Brandon, Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120 Years of 
the UK’s Legal Response to Terrorism, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 981, 990–93 (2004). 
 60. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c.24, § 21(1) (U.K.). 
 61. Id. §§ 21(8), 25. 
 62. Id. § 23. Detainees cannot be removed where, for example, removal or deporta-
tion to a country where the individual concerned may face the death penalty is prevented 
by the United Kingdom’s obligation under Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention 
concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty. Further, the European Court of Human 
Rights has ruled that no one can be removed to a state where he or she would face a real 
risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to the prohibition of torture. See Chahal v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, para. 1 (1997); Soering v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989), paras. 90–91. Fi-
nally, removal or deportation could be impossible for practical reasons, for instance, be-
cause the individual concerned is a stateless person or because the authorities are unable 
to find a country willing to accept him or her. 
 63. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, para. 113. 
 64. Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/3644 
(U.K), available at http://www.uk-legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20013644.htm. 
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The then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, certified and detained six-
teen persons under the ATCSA powers.65 Two of them chose to leave the 
United Kingdom, as the detainees are entitled to do.66 Eleven detainees 
challenged the lawfulness of the derogation order and Part 4 of the 
ATCSA before SIAC.67 In July 2002, SIAC quashed the derogation order 
and granted a declaration that the detention powers contained in the 
ATCSA were incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the European Con-
vention insofar as they permitted detention of suspected international 
terrorists in a way that discriminated against them on the ground of na-
tionality.68 Upon appeal by the Home Secretary, the Court of Appeal 
overturned the decision of SIAC, holding that there were objective and 
justifiable grounds for selecting only non-British citizens for detention.69 
Finally, on December 16, 2004, in their remarkable decision in A v. Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department, an almost unprecedented nine-
member bench of the House of Lords allowed the appeals of the detain-
ees against the Court of Appeal’s decision.70 Although eight of the nine 
Law Lords were satisfied that the government was entitled to take the 
view that there was a public emergency justifying derogation from the 
European Convention,71 the majority also ruled that the derogating meas-
ure, i.e., the indefinite detention without trial of foreign terrorist suspects, 
was not a proportionate means to address the terrorist threat and therefore 
violated the right to liberty.72 Furthermore, the House of Lords held that 
in providing for the detention of foreign, but not British, terrorist sus-
pects, Part 4 of the ATCSA breached the prohibition of discrimination 
contained in Article 14 of the European Convention.73 Accordingly, it 
quashed the derogation order and made a declaration that Section 23 of 
                                                                                                             
 65. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, COUNTER-TERRORISM 
POWERS: RECONCILING SECURITY AND LIBERTY IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: A DISCUSSION 
PAPER, 2004, Cm. 6147, at 6, http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/ 
cm61/6147/6147.htm [hereinafter COUNTER-TERRORISM POWERS]. A further individual 
was certified, but detained under other powers. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 10. 
 68. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2002 WL 31676209, at *1277 (Special 
Imm. App. Comm’n July 30, 2002) (U.K.). 
 69. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1502, [2004] Q.B. 
335, para. 153 (U.K.). 
 70. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, paras. 96–97. 
 71. Id. paras. 25–29 (Lord Bingham), 75 (Lord Nicholls), 115–20 (Lord Hope), 154 
(Lord Scott), 166 (Lord Rodger), 208 (Lord Walker), 226 (Baroness Hale), 240 (Lord 
Carswell). The only Law Lord to deny the existence of a public emergency was Lord 
Hoffmann. Id. paras. 95–97. 
 72. Id. paras. 30–44 (Lord Bingham). 
 73. Id. paras. 45–73. 
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the ATCSA was incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the European 
Convention.74 
As a consequence of the ruling of the House of Lords, the government 
saw itself forced to repeal Part 4 of the ATCSA and to replace it with 
anti-terrorism powers that are equally applicable to foreign and British 
citizens. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, adopted in March 2005, gives 
the Home Secretary the power to impose so-called control orders on 
those he believes are involved in terrorist activities, subjecting them to 
restrictions such as curfew, electronic tagging, a ban on the use of tele-
phones or the internet, restrictions on those the subject may associate 
with, and house arrest.75 
2. United States 
Following September 11, the United States created several new legal 
authorities that allow the executive branch to detain terrorist suspects. 
First, the major piece of legislation introduced as a reaction to the events 
of September 11, the USA Patriot Act, gives the Attorney General wider 
authority to detain immigrants who endanger national security.76 Second, 
a regulation issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on September 20, 
2001, extends the detention powers of the immigration authorities.77 
Third, on September 18, 2001, Congress enacted the Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, entitling the President “to use 
all necessary and appropriate force” against those associated with the 
terrorist attacks of September 11.78 It is this authorization that the Presi-
dent has relied upon to designate over 650 foreign nationals as “enemy 
combatants” and to detain them indefinitely at the military base in 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.79 The “enemy combatant” treatment was later 
extended to two U.S. citizens.80 The fact that the U.S. authorities claim 
that those designated as “enemy combatants” were captured in the course 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. para. 73. 
 75. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1, 2 (U.K.). 
 76. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, § 412. See infra text accompanying notes 82–
86. 
 77. Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) 
(2001). See infra text accompanying notes 88–89. 
 78. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 79. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld, in 
principle, the executive’s authority to detain “enemy combatants” captured abroad, 
whether they be foreign or U.S. citizens. 
 80. The two are Yaser Hamdi and José Padilla. Timothy Lynch, Power and Liberty in 
Wartime, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 25–29 (2004). After almost three years of military 
detention, Hamdi was released on October 11, 2004. Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to 
Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A02. 
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of an armed conflict makes their detention a special case, a detailed 
analysis of which would go beyond the limited scope of this Article. 
Rather, the discussion here centers on the detention of immigrants based 
on the two first-mentioned legal authorities. It should, however, be noted 
that the basic principles resulting from the present analysis are equally 
applicable to detention during armed conflict.81 
Title IV of the USA Patriot Act introduced a number of amendments 
tightening the Immigration and Nationality Act. Most importantly, Sec-
tion 412 of the Patriot Act82 authorizes the Attorney General to certify 
and detain non-citizens if he has “reasonable grounds to believe” that 
they are engaging, or have engaged, in a terrorist activity or otherwise 
endanger national security.83 The Act allows for detention for a period of 
seven days, after which the Attorney General must begin deportation 
                                                                                                             
 81. The guarantee of non-discrimination also applies during armed conflict and is, 
indeed, one of the fundamental principles underlying international humanitarian law, 
running like a red thread through the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Addi-
tional Protocols of 1977. For an overview, see Jelena Pejic, Non-discrimination and 
Armed Conflict, 841 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 183 (2001). In particular, Article 3, common 
to the four Geneva Conventions, and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which are rec-
ognized as reflecting customary international law, require persons in the hands of a party 
to the conflict to be treated without any distinction based on their nationalities. See, e.g., 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, adopted Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts art. 75, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. See 3 THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 40–41 (J.S. Pictet ed., 1960) (stating that national-
ity is one of the prohibited grounds of distinction encompassed by the reference of Com-
mon Article 3 to other similar criteria). Other international humanitarian law norms spe-
cifically prohibit discriminatory treatment of prisoners of war and protected persons on 
the basis of their nationalities. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War art. 16; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 13, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 82. Section 412 amends the Immigration and Nationality Act by adding § 236A (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, § 412(a). 
 83. Id. § 412(a)(3) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(3)). For divergent assessments of 
this provision, see Shirin Sinnar, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Deten-
tion of Aliens under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (2003) (arguing that 
section 412 violates the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee); Mark Bastian, The 
Spectrum of Uncertainty Left by Zadvydas v. Davis: Is the Alien Detention Provision of 
the USA Patriot Act Constitutional?, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 395, 410–21 (2003) (argu-
ing that section 412 is constitutional); Dana Keith, In the Name of National Security or 
Insecurity?: The Potential Indefinite Detention of Noncitizen Certified Terrorists in the 
United States and the United Kingdom in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 16 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 405, 455–63 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court would be likely to uphold 
section 412). 
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proceedings, bring criminal charges against the detainees, or release 
them.84 For non-citizens against whom the government initiates deporta-
tion proceedings, detention must continue until they are “decertified” by 
the Attorney General. This requirement applies even if the detainee is 
granted relief from removal.85 A non-citizen whose removal is unlikely 
in the “reasonably foreseeable future” may be detained for additional six-
month periods if his or her release would “threaten the national security 
of the United States or the safety of the community or any person.”86 The 
Act thus permits the Attorney General to certify foreign nationals as 
threats to national security and to hold them indefinitely. There is no 
guidance as to the process the Attorney General must follow in making 
the decision to certify an individual as a suspected terrorist; in particular, 
the Act does not provide for a hearing or for notice of the basis of certifi-
cation.87 
In practice, the U.S. authorities have mainly relied on an interim immi-
gration regulation, adopted shortly after the September 11 attacks, to de-
tain foreign nationals in connection with the investigation of the attacks. 
For, this regulation on custody procedures, issued by the DOJ on Sep-
tember 17, 2001, grants even more far-reaching powers than the USA 
Patriot Act.88 It allows immigration authorities to detain non-citizens 
suspected of being in violation of an immigration law without charge for 
up to forty-eight hours and for an “additional reasonable period of time” 
in the event of “emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.”89 The 
regulation fails to define the terms “reasonable period of time,” “emer-
gency” or “extraordinary circumstance” and does not require that the 
non-citizen’s detention relate to the external circumstances. Notably, no 
link with alleged terrorism needs to be made. The immigration authori-
ties may even indefinitely detain individuals who are not charged with 
any crime or immigration law violation and against whom no deportation 
proceedings have been initiated. The detainees do not have to be in-
                                                                                                             
 84. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, § 412(a)(5) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(5)). 
 85. Id. § 412(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(2)). 
 86. Id. § 412(a)(6) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6)). 
 87. See Sinnar, supra note 83, at 1432–33. 
 88. Compare Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 
287.3(d) (2001) (“. . . a determination will be made within 48 hours of the arrest, except 
in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a deter-
mination will be made within an additional reasonable period of time, whether the alien 
will be continued in custody or released . . .”), with USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, § 
236A(6) (“An alien…whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, 
may be detained for additional periods of up to six months . . .”). 
 89. Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) 
(2001). 
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formed of the reasons for their detention and are not guaranteed a right to 
contest it.90 
Exactly how many foreign terrorist suspects have been detained in 
connection with the September 11 investigation, and on what legal basis, 
is unclear because the executive shrouded much of its detention program 
in secrecy. The DOJ stopped publishing figures in November 2001 when 
the number of non-citizens held by law enforcement agencies at the fed-
eral, state and local levels had reached around 1,200.91 The Inspector 
General of the DOJ, who carried out an investigation into allegations of 
mistreatment of the September 11 detainees, identified 762 foreign na-
tionals who were detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
on immigration law violations.92 Taking advantage of its wide powers 
under the new regulation on custody procedures, the immigration au-
thorities held many of them for weeks or even months without charging 
them.93 Once charges were filed, they were mostly because of minor im-
migration law violations such as visa overstaying which would not nor-
mally warrant arrest.94 Moreover, the detainees were subject to the so-
called “hold until cleared” policy that the government adopted after Sep-
tember 11, requiring the immigration authorities not to deport or release 
detainees until the FBI has cleared them of any connection to terrorism.95 
This clearance process lasted an average of eighty days from the time of 
arrest and in many cases considerably longer.96 As the review by the In-
spector General established, the policy was applied in an indiscriminate 
manner, resulting in the continued detention of many individuals for 
whom there were no reasonable grounds for suspicion of a connection to 
terrorism.97 Even numerous detainees who had agreed to leave the coun-
try and whose immigration cases had been completed were kept in deten-
                                                                                                             
 90. For a detailed analysis of the regulation, see NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic, In-
definite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 
287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397 (2001). 
 91. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, U.S. to Stop Issuing Detention Tallies, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at A16. 
 92. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 2 (2003) [herein-
after OIG]. 
 93. Id. at 27–36. The OIG identified five detainees who were served with a charge, on 
average, 168 days after their arrest. Id. at 31. 
 94. Id. at 195. 
 95. Id. at 37–71. 
 96. Id. at 51–52. 
 97. Id. at 70. 
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tion as a consequence of the policy.98 Ultimately, almost all of those de-
tained in the first few weeks after the attacks were cleared of terrorist ties 
and removed or released.99 Only three of the foreign nationals arrested by 
the immigration authorities were charged with terrorism-related crimes; 
two of them were acquitted, one was convicted.100 Despite this lack of 
established effectiveness, the U.S. authorities have in recent years con-
tinued to heavily rely on immigration law as part of their anti-terrorism 
efforts.101 
III. RATIONALES FOR THE DETENTION POWERS 
The conformity of the executive detention powers described in Part II 
with the principle of non-discrimination can only be assessed in relation 
to the objectives the detention powers pursue. The considerations set out 
below led both the United Kingdom and the United States to adopt their 
new anti-terrorism detention powers within an immigration context. 
However, it is argued that this choice of an immigration context cannot 
conceal the real primary aim of these powers: they serve to protect na-
tional security rather than to enforce the immigration laws. 
The first reason why terrorism is dealt with in an immigration context 
is linked to the emergence of a new kind of threat perception in the wake 
of September 11: the contemporary terrorist threat is increasingly seen as 
a fundamental civilizational challenge emanating from abroad. This per-
ception was reinforced by the immigration history of the September 11 
hijackers who had all entered the United States on valid visas, and some 
of whom had, unnoticed by the authorities, overstayed.102 Accordingly, 
new counter-terrorism measures such as preventive detention powers are 
primarily targeted at those who try to enter the country or have entered 
recently, serving not only to incapacitate potential terrorists, but also to 
deter them from entering or staying in the first place. This rationale has 
been made explicit, for example, by a senior civil servant of the British 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 108. See also Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged: The 
Detainees; Though Not Linked to Terrorism, Many Detainees Cannot Go Home, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at A01. 
 99. Dan Eggen, U.S. Holds 6 of 765 Detained in 9/11 Sweep, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 
2002, at A20. 
 100. See COLE, supra note 34, at 26. 
 101. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool, WASH. POST, 
June 13, 2005, at A01. 
 102. Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the United States, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 1 (Na-
tional Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, Washington D.C.), Jan. 26, 
2004, at 4, 8, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_state 
ment_1.pdf. 
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Home Office who argued that the detention powers under the ATCSA 
were needed to prevent the perception in other countries, particularly 
Muslim countries, “that the United Kingdom was weak in its response to 
international terrorists operating in its territory.”103 In a similar vein, the 
Home Secretary has claimed that “the existence and use of the powers 
have helped to make the UK a far more hostile environment for interna-
tional terrorists to operate in, with the result that some have been deterred 
from coming here, and others have left entirely, to avoid being certified 
and detained.”104 These statements not only reveal from where the terror-
ist threat is perceived to emanate, but also highlight the symbolic purpose 
of detention powers. At the same time, this policy of deterrence corre-
sponds to the rationale underlying the general tightening of immigration 
controls. 
Second, the adoption of security measures that only apply to those 
without a voice in the democratic process is, for governments, the least 
politically costly way of reacting to terrorist incidents. Preventive deten-
tion powers applicable to both foreign nationals and citizens, in contrast, 
would be unlikely to find the support of a majority. It was again the Brit-
ish Home Office that has put this point most clearly, when explaining its 
reasons for limiting executive detention to non-citizens: 
While it would be possible to seek other powers to detain British citi-
zens who may be involved in international terrorism it would be a very 
grave step. The Government believes that such draconian powers 
would be difficult to justify. Experience has demonstrated the dangers 
of such an approach and the damage it can do to community cohesion 
and thus to the support from all parts of the public that is so essential to 
countering the terrorist threat.105 
As far as non-citizens are concerned, “such draconian powers” are, 
however, seen as justifiable; the support from the foreign part of the pub-
lic is apparently considered less essential. Accordingly, the detention 
powers of the ATCSA were passed with a comfortable majority in the 
House of Commons.106 The suggested control orders under the new Pre-
vention of Terrorism Act 2005, applicable to both British and foreign 
citizens, on the other hand, caused a political storm, compelling the gov-
ernment to make important concessions.107 Similarly, in the United 
                                                                                                             
 103. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, paras. 125, 181 (para-
phrasing a statement by Mr. Whalley, witness before the House of Lords). 
 104. 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 306. 
 105. COUNTER-TERRORISM POWERS, supra note 65, at 9. 
 106. The vote was 341 to 77. 375 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) 404. 
 107. See infra text accompanying notes 197–98. 
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States, the preventive detention campaign directed at more than one 
thousand immigrants and the incarceration of hundreds of foreign nation-
als at Guantánamo Bay have generated only little public attention and 
have faced hardly any political opposition. In stark contrast, there was a 
public outcry when the first two U.S. citizens were taken into military 
custody.108 
Third, immigration law has traditionally been treated as a distinct area 
where the state is accorded particularly far-reaching powers and where 
fewer safeguards (such as access to a lawyer or to a court) apply than in 
criminal law. The imposition of especially stringent rules and enforce-
ment measures on individuals on the basis of their nationality is, of 
course, inherent in immigration law and, as explained in Part I above, the 
executive detention of foreign nationals has accordingly been a long-
standing and accepted feature of immigration law. The justification for 
new detention powers may thus be enhanced if they can be presented as 
being rooted in this tradition, i.e., as pursuing immigration control pur-
poses. 
In fact, however, the main objective pursued by the detention powers 
considered here is not enforcement of the immigration laws but protec-
tion of national security. This is already apparent from the legislative 
history of these powers: they are part of wider anti-terrorism packages 
adopted as a reaction to the attacks of September 11. As a matter of fact, 
the former U.S. Attorney General, John Ashcroft, has freely admitted 
that the new immigration regulation, described in Part II.B.2 above, 
serves to authorize the executive detention of foreign terrorist suspects 
for purposes of criminal investigation and prevention of further attacks: 
“We seek to hold them as suspected terrorists, while their cases are being 
processed on other grounds.”109 This point was reemphasized by the As-
sistant Attorney General who stated that the government’s policy was to 
“use whatever means legally available” to detain persons who might pre-
sent a threat.110 The “hold until cleared” policy must also be seen in this 
light: the fact that even foreign nationals who had agreed to leave were 
kept in detention confirms that the government’s aim was not enforce-
ment of the immigration laws but investigation and prevention of crimi-
nal activity. Equally, with regard to the detention powers under the Brit-
ish ATCSA, the House of Lords has made clear that it would be wrong to 
                                                                                                             
 108. See, e.g., Editorial, Why Mr. Hamdi Matters, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at B06; 
Editorial, Detaining ‘Enemy Combatants’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A22. 
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WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at A1. 
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view them as an immigration issue.111 Instead, it pointed out that, “[t]he 
undoubted aim of the relevant measure . . . was to protect the UK against 
the risk of Al-Qaeda terrorism.”112 In other words, the powers at issue 
were adopted for national security reasons and not for the control of im-
migration. This raises the question of whether executive detention pow-
ers that have, for different reasons, been adopted in an immigration con-
text, and are thus only applicable to foreign nationals, but that are in fact 
designed to counter terrorism, conform to the principle of non-
discrimination. 
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION 
The United Kingdom and the United States both have an obligation 
under international law to respect the principle of equality or non-
discrimination. They have both ratified the ICCPR, which prohibits dis-
crimination in its Articles 2(1) and 26.113 The body tasked with monitor-
                                                                                                             
 111. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, paras. 54 (Lord Bing-
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 112. Id. para. 54. 
 113. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 2, para. 1 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant 
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jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
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standing that it interprets Articles 2(1) and 26 to permit distinctions that “are, at mini-
mum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.” 138 CONG. REC. 8068, 
8071 (1992). It is, however, not clear that this test differs in any respect from the “rea-
sonable and objective” test used by the U.N. Human Rights Committee. General Com-
ment 18: Non-discrimination, para. 13, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., in 
COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 4 (1994) [hereinafter 
HRC General Comment 18]. 
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ing the implementation of the ICCPR, the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee, has pointed out that the latter provision “prohibits discrimination in 
law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authori-
ties.”114 The ICCPR thus imposes a general obligation on party states 
neither to enact legislation with a discriminatory content nor to apply 
laws in a discriminatory way.115 Furthermore, the basic (but non-binding) 
statement of human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
guarantees equality in several of its provisions.116 Finally, more specific 
“soft law” standards governing the treatment of persons in detention, in-
cluding Principle 5(1) of the U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection 
of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment117 and 
Rule 6(1) of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prison-
ers,118 also prohibit any kind of discriminatory treatment. 
Importantly, the authoritativeness of this international law obligation is 
strengthened by the existence of constitutional norms prohibiting dis-
crimination in both states. In the United Kingdom, equality before the 
law has traditionally been regarded as forming part of the rule of law, 
one of the fundamental principles of the constitution.119 In addition, the 
principle of non-discrimination provided by Article 14 of the European 
Convention has now been incorporated into domestic law by way of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.120 Even though Article 14 is a subordinate 
norm, prohibiting discrimination only in the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms otherwise set forth in the Convention, this is of no relevance in 
the particular context of detention, since those detained can claim differ-
ential treatment with regard to the Convention’s right to liberty. In the 
United States, non-discrimination is guaranteed by the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution as far as classi-
fications by state governments are concerned.121 The Supreme Court has 
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 118. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 20. 
 119. See ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 202 (MacMillan and Co., Ltd. 1941) (1885); Arthur J.S. Hall v. Simons, 
(2000) 3 WKLY. L. REP. 543, 560 (H.L.). 
 120. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 1 (U.K.). 
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interpreted the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to test federal 
classifications under the same standard of review.122 
Under both international law and the domestic law of the United King-
dom and the United States, the guarantee of non-discrimination, as well 
as the substantive right to liberty, are not confined to citizens, but extend 
to foreign nationals, irrespective of their legal status in the host coun-
try.123 Furthermore, the equality norms at issue are open-ended as to the 
prohibited grounds of distinction.124 Consequently, differential treatment 
on the basis of citizenship is also prohibited,125 except with respect to a 
                                                                                                             
 122. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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art. 14 (emphases added). The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
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amend. XIV. 
 125. For the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has expressly held that nationality 
is included in the reference to “other status.” Communication, U.N. Human Rights. 
Committee, Decision of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5(4) of the Optional 
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few specific rights that only apply to nationals, such as political rights 
and the right to enter or reside in a country.126 
Nevertheless, the fact that the executive detention powers considered 
in this Article make distinctions on the basis of nationality does not nec-
essarily mean that they violate the principle of non-discrimination. Gov-
ernment actions inevitably classify persons; the crucial question is 
whether these classifications are justified or not. When assessing a dis-
crimination claim, international human rights bodies and national courts 
will first examine whether there has actually been a difference in treat-
ment, i.e., the applicant will need to identify others who, although in a 
comparable position, are treated better.127 Once it is established that per-
sons in analogous situations have been treated differently, the focus of 
the assessment shifts to the existence of a justification for the unequal 
treatment. The first part of this justification test requires that the differ-
ence in treatment pursue a legitimate aim.128 In the case of anti-terrorism 
measures, states will normally be able to meet this requirement quite eas-
ily by referring to national security interests. 
The assessment as to whether differential treatment is justified is thus, 
in practice, mainly controlled by the second leg of the justification test, 
requiring a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the differ-
ence in treatment and the legitimate aim sought to be realized. While 
proportionality is expressly referred to in the caselaw of the European 
Court of Human Rights,129 and is indeed a general principle present 
throughout the European Convention,130 the same concept also emerges 
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 130. See Marc-André Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
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in the Human Rights Committee’s formula that the criteria for differen-
tial treatment must be “reasonable and objective”131 and in the caselaw of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which requires a varyingly close relationship 
between the differential treatment and the aim pursued, depending on the 
applicable standard of review.132 
The strictness with which discrimination claims are reviewed by courts 
can range from a “mere rationality” requirement to a “strict scrutiny” test 
and will generally depend on such criteria as the public aim pursued, the 
individual interest at stake, and the ground on which differential treat-
ment is based.133 While the Human Rights Committee and the European 
Court of Human Rights make the determination of the applicable strict-
ness of review largely dependent on an ad hoc consideration of the fac-
tors involved in the individual case,134 the U.S. Supreme Court has elabo-
rated a system of three different, fairly fixed, standards of review, requir-
ing a “rational,” “substantial,” or “narrowly tailored relationship” of the 
difference in treatment to the government end.135 
In sum, the United Kingdom and the United States are bound under in-
ternational law to comply with a common standard of equality that corre-
sponds in important respects to their respective domestic norms prohibit-
ing discrimination. 
                                                                                                             
HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (Ronald Macdonald, Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1993); 
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 135. See POLYVIOU, supra note 128, at 177–298. 
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V. CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION 
This Part assesses the conformity of the post-September 11 detention 
powers of the United Kingdom and United States against the common 
standard of non-discrimination elaborated in Part IV. The basic princi-
ples emerging from this assessment can be applied to the executive de-
tention of terrorist suspects by any state that has an obligation under in-
ternational law to respect the principle of non-discrimination. 
The British and U.S. legal frameworks considered here treat foreign 
nationals suspected of terrorism involvement differently from domestic 
terrorist suspects insofar as only the former can be preventively detained. 
This difference in treatment must be assessed according to the criteria set 
out in Part IV. One criterion that is relatively unproblematic in the case 
of detention powers is the legitimate aim requirement: states can easily 
meet this requirement by asserting that the detention of foreign terrorist 
suspects serves the protection of national security. The outcome of dis-
crimination challenges to the preventive detention of foreign terrorist 
suspects will thus mainly turn on the following questions: With what 
scrutiny must the detention powers be reviewed? Are foreign terrorist 
suspects in a comparable situation to suspected terrorists who are nation-
als? Is the preventive detention of only those terrorist suspects who are 
non-citizens a proportionate means to achieve the legitimate goal of 
countering the terrorist threat? These questions are now considered in 
turn. 
A. Standard of Review 
That the degree of scrutiny applied by courts to review detention pow-
ers can be of decisive importance for the outcome of respective legal 
challenges is demonstrated by the case concerning the British ATCSA. 
Whereas the Court of Appeal relied on a deferential approach136 and, 
consequently, upheld the detention scheme, the House of Lords subjected 
it to close scrutiny, concluding that it violated fundamental guarantees of 
the European Convention.137 A closer examination of the proper standard 
of review courts should apply to assess the issues of comparability and 
proportionality is therefore required before entering into a substantive 
analysis of those issues. 
The detention of foreign terrorist suspects is at the intersection of two 
areas where courts have traditionally exercised great deference towards 
the executive and the legislature: national security and immigration. As 
far as national security is concerned, international courts and bodies have 
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often accorded domestic authorities a wide margin of appreciation, 
mainly out of respect for national sovereignty, of which the nation-state’s 
right to defend itself in times of crisis is seen as the bedrock.138 Two fur-
ther reasons explain the traditional deference given by national courts to 
the executive, the military and the legislature: first, the idea that, accord-
ing to the democratic principle, public interest considerations should be 
made by elected representatives, not by unelected judges; and, second, 
what has been termed “institutional capacity,” i.e., the notion that other 
branches of government may have special expertise in national security 
matters and are better equipped than the judiciary to know and evaluate 
risk in this area.139 Accordingly, examples of judicial self-restraint in na-
tional security matters can be found in the caselaw of both British140 and 
U.S. courts.141 In the field of immigration, judicial deference stems from 
the perception that the power to exclude and deport foreigners is an im-
portant incident of sovereignty properly belonging to the government, 
due to its close relationship with national security, foreign relations and 
other highly political issues.142 This power has therefore traditionally 
been seen in the United Kingdom as a prerogative of the Crown143 and in 
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the United States as a “plenary power” of Congress.144 Stephen Legom-
sky has demonstrated how these doctrines have resulted in strikingly 
similar patterns of judicial self-restraint in the immigration caselaw of 
British and U.S. courts.145 
However, the following two reasons call for strict scrutiny as far as the 
review of powers authorizing the preventive detention of foreign terrorist 
suspects is concerned. First, in a rights-based system, the judiciary is 
tasked with reviewing governmental actions for their compliance with 
certain fundamental rights and it cannot simply abdicate this supervisory 
responsibility by invoking a lack of institutional capacity or arguing that 
governmental powers in the fields of national security and immigration 
are inherent in sovereignty.146 In national security matters, both interna-
tional and domestic, including British and U.S., courts have increasingly 
come to recognize this and have generally been moving towards a more 
stringent review: the mere fact that national security interests are in-
volved, they have held, does not automatically entail a lenient standard of 
review.147 A similar trend can be observed in cases concerning immigra-
tion, so that even if the detention of foreign terrorist suspects was to be 
seen as an immigration matter, it would have to be subject to strict scru-
tiny. For although the regulation of immigration, i.e., the setting of ad-
mission and removal terms, may be a matter for the legislature and the 
executive, it does not follow that detention pursuant to immigration con-
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trol should not be subject to substantive judicial control.148 This has been 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent decision in Zadvydas 
v. Davis, holding that the plenary power of Congress in immigration mat-
ters “is subject to important constitutional limitations.”149 
Second, according to the established practice of both international and 
domestic courts, the intensity of review must be particularly great where 
fundamental interests are at stake.150 That the right to personal liberty is 
one of the most fundamental human rights is already apparent from its 
long history and widespread codification,151 and has been repeatedly rec-
ognized by international,152 British,153 and U.S. courts.154 Even in a ter-
rorist context, the European Court of Human Rights has stressed the im-
portance of the protection against arbitrary deprivation of liberty and has 
insisted on a strict review.155 On this basis, the House of Lords, in the 
case concerning detention under the ATCSA, decidedly rejected the gov-
ernment’s argument—previously accepted by the Court of Appeal—that 
it should be allowed a considerable margin in deciding whom to subject 
to powers of preventive detention.156 Although the executive may be bet-
ter placed than the judiciary to assess the existence of a terrorist threat, 
the Law Lords held, the measures it adopts in response to this threat must 
be subject to close scrutiny by the courts, particularly if they affect the 
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right to liberty.157 For the courts are, as Lord Bingham put it, “specialists 
in the protection of liberty,”158 and the more far-reaching the deprivation 
of liberty at issue, the closer the scrutiny applied by the courts must be.159 
These considerations led even the only Law Lord who sided with the 
government, Lord Walker, to conclude: “Measures which result in the 
indefinite detention in a high-security prison of individuals who have not 
been tried for (or even charged with) any offence, and who may be inno-
cent of any crime, plainly invite judicial scrutiny of considerable inten-
sity.”160 This must hold true not only for the British context but for the 
executive detention of terrorist suspects in general. 
B. Comparability 
Under the detention powers at issue, foreign terrorist suspects are 
treated differently from nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism. 
For a discrimination claim to succeed, it must, however, first be estab-
lished that this latter group is a suitable comparator. Are suspected terror-
ists who are citizens in a comparable, i.e., analogous or relevantly simi-
lar, situation to those who are foreign nationals? 
The question of comparability cannot be answered in the abstract but 
must be judged in relation to the actual aim pursued by the measure un-
der consideration.161 As far as detention is used to enforce deportation, 
i.e., as an instrument of immigration control, it could be argued that for-
eign citizens and nationals are not comparable groups because only the 
former can be deported. However, the purpose of the detention of foreign 
terrorist suspects is not enforcement of deportation. Rather, as has been 
demonstrated in Part III, the British and U.S. detention powers are de-
signed to prevent terrorism and mainly apply to precisely those foreign 
nationals who cannot be removed. Thus, in an anti-terrorism context, the 
difference between the two groups in terms of deportability becomes 
merely theoretical and therefore, irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, the British Court of Appeal concluded that, even though 
they cannot be deported, the foreign terrorist suspects falling under the 
powers of the ATCSA were still not in a comparable situation to British 
terrorist suspects: they had only a right not to be removed, whereas the 
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latter had a right of abode. Therefore, foreign terrorist suspects fell into a 
different legal class.162 This argument was decidedly rejected by the 
House of Lords. For, as Lord Rodger correctly pointed out, as far as de-
tention in the present context is concerned, the critical factor is not the 
immigration status of those to be detained but the threat they are sus-
pected of posing.163 More precisely, those subject to the detention powers 
are chosen on the basis of the following characteristics: (i) they are sus-
pected international terrorists; (ii) they cannot be successfully prose-
cuted; and (iii) they cannot be deported.164 Both the terrorist suspects 
who are non-citizens and those who are nationals share these relevant 
characteristics. Thus, they are in an analogous situation. To hold other-
wise would be to accept the choice of immigration control as a means to 
address the terrorist threat, when it is the correctness of that choice that is 
the disputed issue. 
In sum, distinctions in terms of immigration status can only matter 
where the purpose of the detention is removal and those detained can 
actually be deported in timely fashion. The European Convention, for 
example, explicitly authorizes detention that is only applicable to immi-
grants, but only insofar as “action is being taken with a view to deporta-
tion or extradition.”165 By contrast, where detention is used to prevent 
criminal activity or to protect national security, the mere legal difference 
between foreign nationals and citizens is not a relevant characteristic of 
distinction, and states cannot make it more relevant simply by placing 
their detention powers within an immigration context. 
C. Objective and Reasonable Justification 
Once it is established that persons in a comparable situation have been 
treated differently, it must be judged whether an objective and reasonable 
justification for the differential treatment exists. Are there objective and 
reasonable grounds for singling out foreign terrorist suspects for preven-
tive detention? The mere fact that states have generally been seen as al-
lowed under international law to make distinctions on the ground of na-
tionality in an immigration context and to detain foreign citizens in times 
of crisis does not in itself provide a sufficient justification. It is, as the 
House of Lords observed in A v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, “indeed obvious that in an immigration context some differen-
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tiation must almost inevitably be made between nationals and non-
nationals. . .”166 Yet foreign citizenship cannot justify every difference in 
treatment. Rather, the question as to the existence of an objective and 
reasonable justification must be answered in relation to the concrete aim 
and effects of the differential treatment under consideration.167 The aim 
in the present case is the prevention of terrorism, and the relevant ques-
tion is whether it is necessary and appropriate to focus on immigration 
control in response to the danger posed by international terrorism. 
In other words, the assessment as to whether differential treatment is 
justified or not is mainly controlled by the proportionality requirement. 
This principle, which is applied in one form or another under all the in-
ternational and domestic legal systems at issue,168 requires that there is a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the difference in 
treatment and the aim sought to be realized. This complex assessment as 
to whether a fair balance between individual rights and a public interest, 
here national security, has been struck may involve a whole range of dif-
ferent sub-tests. For the present purpose, it is helpful to group them into 
two chronologically successive stages of inquiry. First, in the shorter 
term, the distinction according to citizenship on which the detention 
powers are based, must be a suitable and effective means to address the 
terrorist threat. Second, the wider impacts of the differential treatment 
must be evaluated, particularly insofar as the long-term effectiveness of 
preventive detention is concerned. 
1. Short-Term Suitability 
The perception that the post-September 11 terrorist threat constitutes a 
qualitatively new phenomenon reflective of wide cultural differences has 
led states to increasingly rely on broad criteria to determine the scope of 
application of anti-terrorism regimes. The executive detention powers of 
both the United Kingdom and the United States are evidence of this ap-
proach: they are not even limited to presumed members of al-Qaeda, but 
extend to all foreign nationals who are suspected of having links with 
terrorist groups. However, is the citizenship status of the suspected ter-
rorists a suitable criterion to determine the applicability of detention 
powers? 
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This question could only be answered in the affirmative if there was a 
difference in terms of dangerousness between citizens and non-citizens, 
i.e., if the terrorist threat stemmed exclusively, or at least almost exclu-
sively, from the foreign section of the population. Yet the available evi-
dence suggests that this is not the case. For the United Kingdom, the 
Newton Committee, a committee of Privy Counsellors set up under Sec-
tion 122 of the ATCSA to review the operation of the Act, stated in their 
report to Parliament: “We have been told that, of the people of interest to 
the authorities because of their suspected involvement in international 
terrorism, nearly half are British nationals.”169 SIAC, who were also al-
lowed to consider the material classified as confidential by the govern-
ment, observed that it was clear that in the opinion of the Home Secre-
tary there were suspected British terrorists at liberty in the United King-
dom.170 And the House of Lords concluded that the material submitted by 
the government showed a “high level of involvement of British citizens . 
. . in the terrorist networks.”171 The London bombings of July 7, 2005 
provided chilling evidence for these assessments.172 Equally, it cannot be 
said that the terrorist threat to the United States stems only from foreign 
nationals. In fact, a large part of those charged by the U.S. authorities 
with terrorist offences allegedly related to al-Qaeda since September 11 
are U.S. citizens173 as are some of those held without charge as “enemy 
combatants.” 174 
The scope of application of both the British and U.S. detention powers 
is thus based on an inappropriate criterion, and it is not surprising that the 
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corresponding detention initiatives have produced hardly any results in 
the form of terrorism charges. It is, of course, very difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of preventive detention campaigns, since governments will 
claim that they are targeted at exactly those against whom there is not 
sufficient evidence for bringing charges. Nevertheless, it would not seem 
completely unreasonable to expect that after months, or even years of 
detention, the authorities would be able to bring at least some of these 
cases before the courts. Yet of the more than one thousand foreigners 
preventively detained in the United States immediately after September 
11, only three have been charged with any terrorism-related crime.175 
This contrasts starkly with the “success rate” from prior to September 11 
when, on average, charges were brought against more than fifty percent 
of the U.S. citizens and foreign nationals arrested under criminal law on 
suspicion of terrorism involvement.176 As far as the United Kingdom is 
concerned, none of the detainees held for more than three years under the 
ATCSA powers have ever been charged. These poor “success rates” to 
some extent also reflect the fact that the incapacitation of potential terror-
ists is not even the main purpose of the detention powers: as explained in 
Part III above, they serve just as much as a symbolic instrument of deter-
rence. Yet this policy of deterrence is flawed for the same reasons: citi-
zenship is not a suitable criterion to define its target group; preventive 
detention would need to deter potential terrorists rather than immigrants. 
The perception of the contemporary terrorist threat as being rooted in a 
broader civilizational conflict, considerations of political feasibility, and 
the traditional susceptibility of the immigration law to far-reaching re-
strictions of personal liberty have thus led both the British and the U.S. 
governments to rely on a criterion that is not only extremely broad, but 
also unsuitable to determine the applicability or non-applicability of pre-
ventive detention powers. The group targeted by the respective powers is 
not only broadly, but wrongly defined. In the words of the Newton 
Committee: “What is important is the nature of the threat, not the ideol-
ogy behind it or the nationality of the perpetrator.”177 
2. Long-Term Consequences 
The effectiveness, and therewith proportionality, of the citizenship dis-
tinction employed by the detention powers under consideration not only 
hinges on its short-term suitability to address the terrorist threat. Rather, 
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the effects that this distinction produces in the longer term must also be 
taken into account. And in this regard there is evidence to suggest that 
preventive detention powers that are reserved to foreign citizens contrib-
ute to the alienation of exactly those communities whose co-operation 
with the police would be crucial in anti-terrorist investigations.178 
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the House of Lords did not 
enter into an analysis of the long-term implications of preventive deten-
tion—perhaps because it simply did not have a reason to do so, given its 
clear finding that the detention powers were in any event an unsuitable 
means to counter international terrorism. Other sources do, however, 
point to their potentially alienating effects. The Newton Committee 
stated that they had “heard evidence that the existence of these powers, 
and uncertainty about them, has led to understandable disquiet among 
some parts of the Muslim population.”179 The Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe wrote that the powers clearly have had 
“a negative affect [sic] on both the perception of Muslims by the rest of 
the population and the confidence of many Muslims in the fairness of the 
executive,”180 and both the Leader of the Muslim Parliament of Great 
Britain and the President of the Muslim Association of Britain have criti-
cized them as stigmatizing Muslims and fuelling extremism.181 Similarly, 
the U.S. detention initiatives have reportedly contributed to a feeling of 
alienation and stigmatization among the Muslim and Arab communities 
in the United States.182 The resulting disengagement may have important 
implications for the success rate of anti-terrorism investigations since, as 
the Newton Committee has correctly pointed out, “[i]t is important that 
legislation against terrorism should attract wide public acceptance to 
maximise its effectiveness.”183 Communities who feel unjustifiably tar-
geted by stringent anti-terrorism measures are less likely to trust, and 
therefore cooperate with, law enforcement agencies. 
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The conclusion that, in the long term, executive detention powers di-
rected against specific groups may have a counter-productive effect is 
further supported by the experiences made with previous internment ini-
tiatives in both the United Kingdom and the United States. A review of 
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, for example, con-
cluded that the Northern Irish internment powers, which were used al-
most exclusively against the Catholic community,184 had been “a cause 
of distress and bitter resentment, so that people were provoked into sym-
pathising with the terrorists and so internment acted as a recruitment 
boost.”185 And a former Home Secretary stated during the debate on the 
ATCSA that internment “is undoubtedly thought to have exacerbated 
rather than contained the IRA terrorist threat.”186 In fact, the first year 
following reintroduction of internment, 1972, was the most violent in 
Northern Irish history.187 Similarly, the available evidence suggests that 
the U.S. mass internment of persons of Japanese descent during the Sec-
ond World War contributed little to the security of the nation, instead 
engendering significant resentment among the Japanese part of the popu-
lation.188 
D. Result 
Powers of executive detention that only apply to foreign terrorist sus-
pects treat two groups who are in a comparable situation differently: sus-
pected terrorists who are nationals and foreign terrorist suspects share all 
the relevant characteristics in relation to the aim of preventing terrorism. 
Both international human rights bodies and domestic courts would be 
likely to employ strict scrutiny to review claims that such powers are dis-
criminatory. Thus, weighty reasons would have to be put forward to jus-
tify the difference in treatment on the basis of nationality. Such reasons 
do not exist. The distinction according to citizenship is an unsuitable 
means to prevent terrorism where the threat stems not exclusively from 
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the foreign part of the population. Furthermore, the long-term negative 
effects of detention powers limited to foreign citizens support the conclu-
sion that the difference in treatment is ineffective and disproportionate. 
The principle of non-discrimination does not prevent states from de-
taining non-nationals where this is necessary to enforce the immigration 
laws since only they, but not citizens, are subject to immigration control. 
Yet where the aim pursued by detention is not enforcement of the immi-
gration laws but protection of national security, differential treatment on 
the ground of citizenship can only be justified if there is a difference in 
terms of dangerousness between nationals and non-nationals. It is con-
ceivable that such a difference might exist in a traditional war situation 
where states are pitted against each other, although any wartime intern-
ment would still necessitate derogation from the right to liberty guaran-
teed by international human rights instruments and would thus have to be 
“strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”189 In contrast, in the 
so-called war on terror—where the battle lines are not drawn along the 
borders of states—the criterion of nationality cannot be of any relevance 
for the definition of the scope of application of detention powers. Conse-
quently, differential treatment of non-citizens with regard to preventive 
anti-terrorism detention violates the international human rights principle 
of non-discrimination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the post-September 11 detention powers 
targeting foreign nationals should be understood as a symbolic instru-
ment of deterrence directed at a perceived civilizational threat, as a po-
litically convenient way of demonstrating a strong reaction to terrorist 
attacks, and as steeped in a long tradition of reserving the most severe 
restrictions of the right to liberty to foreign citizens. These powers were 
passed as part of legislative packages propelled through parliaments in 
record time, without thorough consideration of the need for them or their 
effectiveness.190 In fact, they are not even intended to address the terror-
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ist threat in a sustained and global manner, but merely to dislocate it: 
those subject to the powers can evade detention by opting to leave the 
country. In other words, the new preventive detention powers are part of 
a risk management strategy relying on exceptional short-term measures, 
rather than a principled approach to combating terrorism within clear 
legal constraints. 
A critical analysis of these powers from a non-discrimination perspec-
tive makes it not only possible to highlight these flaws, but also to 
thereby pave the way for a debate about anti-terrorism measures that is 
framed in terms of generally valid rules and principles rather than short-
term utilitarian arguments—a debate, in other words, that is grounded in 
a culture of formalism and universalism, guided by Kant’s categorical 
imperative.191 This (re)turn to formalism, recently and most prominently 
advocated by Martti Koskenniemi for the international law field,192 
should not be seen as apolitical.193 Rather, it is adopted as a strategy of 
constraining state power and protecting the weak. In Koskenniemi’s 
words, “nothing has undermined formalism as a culture of resistance to 
power, a social practice of accountability, openness, and equality whose 
status cannot be reduced to the political positions of any one of the par-
ties whose claims are treated within it.”194 In many ways, such a use of 
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formalism also borrows from the work of historian E.P. Thompson, who 
similarly embraced the rule of law as a bulwark for the defense of popu-
lar rights.195 
The political conflict over new anti-terrorism measures in the United 
Kingdom, which was triggered by the House of Lords’ finding that the 
original detention powers violated the principle of non-discrimination, 
illustrates the point. The first post-September 11 anti-terrorism law, the 
ATCSA, had been passed with a comfortable majority196 and without 
attracting great public attention. The limitation of the scope of its preven-
tive detention powers to foreign terrorist suspects was a politically con-
venient way of avoiding a discussion of the fundamental issues raised by 
this most severe form of deprivation of liberty. This paucity of principled 
debate stands in stark contrast to the history of the Prevention of Terror-
ism Act 2005—the government’s response to the Law Lords’ ruling. 
The proposed measures, which, in order to comply with the ruling, 
were made applicable to both foreign and British citizens, led to a major 
public debate on the balance between security and liberty and to “parlia-
ment’s longest and sometimes rowdiest sitting for 99 years.”197 The two 
major opposition parties opposed the Home Secretary’s authority to sub-
ject anyone suspected of terrorism involvement to control orders as a 
matter of principle, claiming that it violated central tenets of justice go-
ing back to the Magna Carta.198 The Act was only passed after the gov-
ernment had made substantial concessions, in particular by providing for 
greater involvement of the judiciary in the control order process. 
The extension of the scope of anti-terrorism powers to British citizens 
due to the House of Lords decision thus reshaped the debate in crucial 
ways. The discussants were forced to consider the possibility of the law 
being applied against themselves (or at least their constituents), and, as a 
consequence, the discussion became not only more substantive but now 
had to be articulated in terms of generally valid rules and principles. This 
shift towards formal legal rules resulted in a curtailment of the execu-
tive’s powers: preventive detention was replaced with lesser forms of 
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restrictions of liberty, which, in addition, are subject to greater judicial 
control. 
The import of a culture of formalism should not be overestimated: uni-
versally applicable, non-discriminatory rules are not necessarily good 
rules. The new Prevention of Terrorism Act still raises a number of im-
portant human rights concerns.199 But at least “a practice that builds on 
formal arguments that are available to all under conditions of equality”200 
can protect those in the political minority from being subject to the unre-
strained power of the state. 
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